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SHOULD A BANK ACQUIRE, MERGE OR DIVEST?

MAUREN SnE

*

BATEum*

Keynote Speaker

INTRODUCTION
I want to go through a specific bank's experience in evaluating its individual businesses and what
led it to decide whether it should merge, spin-off, or acquire. In particular, I will focus on the legal
implications of these decisions. The bank which I will use for this discussion will be U.S. Trust Company
of New York ("U.S. Trust").

I NON-DISCRETIONARYBUSINESSES
U.S. Trust is an institution with capital assets of about $4 billion and value to shareholders of
approximately $363 million.'

Its businesses generally fit into two categories: discretionary and non-

discretionary. The non-discretionary businesses involve back-office processing for unit investment trusts

This speech was part of a symposium held at Fordham University School of Law on March 12, 1996 entitled
M & A: Survival of the Fittest in the 21st Century, Strategic Positioning In the Banking and Communications
Industries.
.. Ms. Bateman is Senior Vice-President & General Counsel for U.S. Trust. Prior to joining U.S. Trust, Ms.
Bateman was an Attorney at Bankers Trust and Morgan Guaranty Trust and an associate at Davis, Polk & Wardwell.
I Press Release from United States Trust Company of New York, U.S. Trust Agrees to Sell Securities
ProcessingBusinesses to ChaseManhattan,PR NEwsWiRE, Nov. 18, 1994 [hereinafter Press Release]; U.S. TRUsT
COMPANY OF NEw YORK,INC., Proxy Statement (Feb. 9,1995) [hereinafter Proxy Statement], at 1 (indicating that the
value on the closing date of the merger would be less than $363.5 million).

FORDHAM FIN. SEC. TAX LAW FORUM

(UTM), master trusts, and mutual funds.2 The non-discretionary side is generally a high volume, backoffice processing business with low profit margins.

A. UITBusiness

The UIT business is a closed-end investment securities portfolio, generally comprised of municipal
bonds although some contain high-yield bonds. UITs are passive asset pools administered by a trustee,
who serves as custodian, recordkeeper, income collector, disburser, and transfer agent.3 UITs have natural
maturities and the individual investor buys a piece known as a unit.
The unit investment trustee retains custody of the units and receives payments from the various
securities that are held by the UIT, but only makes disbursements to unit holders every six months. This
creates a tremendous float for the trustee. While the trustee receives payments throughout each six month
period, the trustee makes disbursements only twice a year. In the interim, the trustee retains the use of the
cash and receives fees based on the amount of assets held. These fees gradually decrease throughout the
term of the trust because the assets are disbursed as they mature.
UITs are not as popular today as in the past. The mutual fund, or open-end mutual fund, industry
is much stronger and people tend to invest in them more than in UITs, which have an older, more
4

conservative market.

2Proxy Statement, supra note 1, at 28 (regardingU.S. Trust's five lines of business). According to the Proxy
Statement, U.S. Trust "conducts five principal businesses: asset management, private banking, special fiduciary,
corporate trust and securities processing." Id.

3U.S.TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK,INC., U.S. TRUST: A HISTORY OF GROWTH WrrH A COMMITMENT TO

PERSONAL SERVICE, Jan. 1994, at 9 (unpublished document, on file with U.S. Trust Company of New York).
4See Chet Currier, Funds Low-Key Relatives: UnitInvestment Trusts, Cfu. SUN-TIME, May 12, 1996, at 83.
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B. Master Trust Business
The second non-discretionary business, the master trust, is a high volume business. To remain
competitive in this business, you have to implement the latest technology in data processing. For U.S.
Trust, this would have required a large investment to strengthen the global custody and multi-currency
businesses.5

C Mutual Fund Business
The mutual fund servicing business is also an operations oriented business with a low profit
margin. Businesses with low profit margins rely on a high volume of transactions, with a large number of
them being the same, so that they can build up their profit Maintaining high volume is the key to nondiscretionary securities processing business.

R DISCRETIONARYBUSINESSES
The other side of the business is discretionary in nature and yields high profit margins. It includes
private banking, custody, and trusts and estates businesses. Private banking is involved in the more
traditional banking businesses of accepting deposits, making loans, administering checking accounts and

5 See Proxy Statement, supra note 1, at 31. According to the Proxy Statement, the U.S. Trust board, in
reaching this determination and recommendation considered the following factors:
(c) the scale required to maintain or improve margins in securities processing businesses generally,
the growth prospects of UST with and without the Processing Business, UST's lack of an in-house
global custody capability and other related revenue producing services that could improve the
profitability of the Processing Business, and the potential for damaging the reputation of UST and its
overall franchise business resulting from the relative difficulty faced by smaller institutions in
managing the inherent operating risks in securities processing businesses generally.
Id.
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money market accounts. The trust business deals with personal trusts as opposed to employee benefit
trusts.
The investment management business is highly discretionary and basically involves the
management of money by investing in stocks and bonds. The corporate trust business is the least
discretionary, but is appealing because of its cash management component.
These businesses are much more dependent upon the officers who are running them and especially
upon their discretionary decisions. However, they do not require extensive back office processing staff or
sophisticated computer systems to stay in them.

1HI SHOULD U.S. TRUSTACQUIRE, MERGE OR DIVEsT?
In 1993, U.S. Trust's profits were high and the market liked its stock. However, there were signs
of trouble in the future. The non-discretionary processing businesses eventually would require large
investments of capital to realize a good return, despite their low profit margins. U.S. Trust feared that if it
did not do something about the large processing side of the business, the market might respond adversely,
the stock price would go down, and someone would come in and acquire the institution.
U.S. Trust had three choices. The first was to purchase more processing businesses. Although it
had the capital to do this, U.S. Trust, as an institution, was inclined toward the discretionary businesses,
much more so than the processing businesses. U.S. Trust was expanding into the discretionary areas of
business, and most of its senior officers were working in those areas.

6

6PressRelease, supra note 1,at 2. According to the press release:
[t]he sale of our securities processing businesses and the outsourcing of our operational services will
enable U.S. Trust to concentrate all of its resources on its core businesses- asset management services
for individuals, institutions and mutual funds, private banking, special fiduciary services and
corporate trust - where we have expanded nationally in recent years and where our growth prospects

are very bright.
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The second possibility was to initiate a joint venture with, for example, a Japanese bank that might

need additional computer capacity, but would not want to have its own platform. Joint ventures are risky,
however, because their success is largely based upon mutual trust. There would be questions concerning
who would use the platform when and who would get priority. Contractually binding two parties in a joint
venture is also very difficult, particularly in the banling environment due to security concerns.
The third possibility was to sell the processing businesses. These businesses represented almost
one-third of the capital of U.S. Trust and almost two-fifths of its employees. Maing this decision was
heart rending. After great angst, U.S. Trust decided to sell the processing businesses.

IVDIVESTITURE

During the week of March 3 through March 9, 1996, the New York Times was replete with articles
regarding how many people were being laid off.7 Management at U.S. Trust, however, decided to sell its
businesses only to institutions that would agree to take the employees along with the processing businesses.
This narrowed the field of possible buyers.
U.S. Trust had a "dog and pony" show and had potential bidders sign the requisite letters of
looking no further and agree to do nothing else than look at the material. These standstill agreements8
continued for over four years. The last thing U.S. Trust wanted was to have someone come in and attempt

to acquire the whole institution.

Id.

7Louis Uchitelle & N.R. Kleinfield, The Downsizing ofAmerica: On the Battlefields ofBusiness, Millions of

Casualties,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, at 1 (seven-part article series analyzing how 43 million jobs were lost in the
United States since 1979 as a result of corporate downsizing); David E. Sanger & Steve Lohr, The Downsizing of

America: A Search for Answers to Avoid the Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1996, at 1 (last of seven article series).
According to the article series, "[c]ounting only the lay-offs prominent enough to show up in newspapers around the
country, the consulting firm Challenger, Gray & Christmas reported 15,962 workers have been cast out of their jobs in

just the week since this series began." Id.
SLouis Loss & Joel Seligman, SECURITIES REGULATION, at 6D.1 (1995), Standstill agreements are
"contract[s] not to purchase any more shares of a target for a specified period of time." Id.
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Our efforts resulted in five institutions reviewing the deal. Three institutions, Chase Manhattan
Bank, Northern Trust Company, and Bank of New York submitted bids. Ultimately, the bidding results
were excellent for U.S. Trust and the eventual winner was Chase Manhattan Bank. 9 Chase made the
acquisition to bolster its processing businesses. U.S. Trust's UlT business was the largest such business in
the market' ° This raised some antitrust issues since Chase's U1T business, when combined with that of
U.S. Trust, totaled over 51 percent of the market and raised concerns of undue market concentration under
the Sherman Act. Fortunately, this issue was overcome.
Chase had the platform, but needed the employees for the master trust business. Most importantly,
the mutual fund servicing company was located in Boston, where Chase wanted a presence.
Prior to this acquisition, Chase did not have a mutual fund servicing component and this deal gave
Chase a much larger presence in the processing business in general.

Chase's desire to expand its

processing business turned out to be the main reason they wanted the deal."

A. Structuringthe Deal
U.S. Trust's next issue was structuring the deal. Should it be an asset sale or should it be a spinoff, stock for stock? The decision to structure the divestiture as a spin-off entailed many legal questions.
The UIT business was very profitable and the sponsors, who package these investments, would
have loved an opportunity to renegotiate the contract that established the fees paid to the trustee. The only

9Steven Lipin, Chase to Buy U.S. TrustLinesHandlingStock, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1994, at B4.

10Rd The article states that "[for Chase, the transaction bolsters its already strong presence in securities
processing. Chase is a leader in the business of providing administrative and other recordkeeping services for investors

and corporations." Id.

11
d. According to the article, Chase's acquisition of U.S. Trust's securities processing line "would strengthen
the bank's [Chase's] position providing custodial services to mutual funds, while achieving significant economies of

scale." Id.
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way to avoid a renegotiation of these indentures was to have the entire corporate entity transferred rather
than selling the indentures (assets) themselves.
U.S. Trust decided to effect the sale of the securities processing businesses in two simultaneous
steps. First, U.S. Trust spun-off the asset management, private banking, special fiduciary, and corporate
trust businesses to its shareholders in the form of a new holding company, U.S. Trust Corporation. A new
bank subsidiary was created, United States Trust Company of New York. U.S. Trust shareholders received
shares in the new holding company on a share-for-share basis. 12 U.S. Trust's second step was to merge the
original holding company and its principal subsidiary, including the assets and liabilities of the securities
processing businesses, with Chase.' 3 As consideration for the original holding company, U.S. Trust
received shares of Chase, which were immediately distributed to U.S. Trust's shareholders.
The law prevented U.S. Trust from transferring the trusteeship from one personal trustee to
another without permission of the settler or the beneficiaries.'

4

U.S. Trust had to obtain a Morris Trust

ruling 5 in order to complete this transaction on a tax-free basis. If the ruling had not been obtained,
enormous taxes would have to be paid which might have made the transaction less attractive to Chase. In
addition, U.S. Trust had to obtain confirmation from the New York State Banking Board that all of the
trusts which had named the original trust company as trustee should be transferred to new U.S. Trust. To
obtain this confirmation, U.S. Trust had to convince the New York State Banking Board that the UIT and
Master Trust businesses - which were not being transferred - were custodial, not fiduciary in nature, since
New York law required that all fiduciary relationships be transferred.

12PressRelease, supra note l, at 1.
13A,

at 1 (explaining that Chase's acquisition included only the assets and liabilities of U.S. Trust's securities

processing businesses).
4RETATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSrs § 106(c) (1959).
15 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794, (4th Cir. 1966) (recognizing spin-off
stock as a non-taxable gain); Proxy Statement, supra note 1,at 11.
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The custodial business was left in the original trust company in order to be merged with Chase
while the fiduciary business was transferred from the original trust company to the new trust company. 16
The transfer of the fiduciary business was achieved, without the permission of the beneficiaries, under an
exception in the New York Banking Law.' 7 U.S. Trust obtained permission, 18 which was granted in the
form ofa letter from the New York State Banking Department agreeing with U.S. Trust's position.
The next step was to obtain approval from various regulators. The Federal Reserve authorized
U.S. Trust to set up a new bank holding company and allowed for the transfer itself. The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") was also required to approve the transaction, since two of U.S.
Trust's banking subsidiaries were national banks under the jurisdiction of the OCC. The New York State
Banking Board granted U.S. Trust permission to transfer the discretionary fiduciary assets. U.S. Trust
needed authorization from the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") because within this corporation there
was a thrift. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), insured U.S. Trust for all of the new
entities. Ultimately, U.S. Trust received the Morris Trust ruling from the IRS.'
This process began on November 1, 1993 the day the contract was signed, and lasted until August
29, 1995, when the deal closed. Everyone was wondering how the market would react. The market
capitalization of the stock, after the spin-off and the closing, was and still is today $500 million. The value
of the stock that was spun-off to the shareholders in the tax-free exchange was approximately $363

16Proxy Statement, supra note 1, at 28 (outlining U.S. Trust's pre-merger and post-merger corporate

structure).' 7 N.Y. Banking

Law § 604-a (McKinney 1995) (allowing a banking institution
to transfer all or substantially
all of its assets to another banking institution if the transferee agrees to assume all fiduciary relationships of the
t
lansferorId,
(requiring the approval of the Superintendent of the State Banking Board).
'"Morris

Trust, supra note 15.
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million.20 The market's reaction reveals that U.S. Trust is worth the same today as it was before and after
the spin-off.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to what some describe as a purely rational, purely mathematical decision, in this case it
was also an emotional one. It was a decision made by management which required the buyer to retain the
employees' jobs. The divestiture affected 1,370 employees. Approximately 1,200 workers received jobs
at the new company, while others found employment elsewhere or were severanced. 21 The employees who
were not offered jobs at Chase were given generous economic packages, which in several cases enabled
them to retire. Thus, U.S. Trust was able to achieve its two aims in this transaction. First it repositioned
itself in the marketplace as a money manager, in the process enriching its shareholders for their investment
in U.S. Trust. And second, it was able to protect the interests of its loyal workers, by either contractually

providing for their continued employment with the new company - and this isthe vast majority of workers or economically providing for the remainder. Consequently, this was a win-win solution for all parties.

20 Proxy Statement, supranote 1, at 1.
21See Press Release, supranote 1 (regarding employee positions). The press release explained that

[off U.S. Trust's total workforce of almost 2,700 people, approximaely 1,150 employees currently
working in the company's securities processing businesses, including computer services and securities
operations, will become employees of Chase Manhattan as a result of the merger and outsourcing
agreement.... Up to an additional 200 U.S. Trust employees in those businesses and in staff and
support areas will be outplaced in the downsizing that will accompany the transaction.
Id.
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